THE LEGAL BASIS AND LEGAL FORCE OF NORMATIVE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

The legal basis for the legal status of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan consists of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the laws adopted in accordance with it, such as the Constitutional Law "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan," the Law "On Normative Legal Acts," as well as the normative resolution of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated March 6, 1997, No. 3, and other normative legal acts.

Acts of the Supreme Court that provide clarifications on issues of judicial practice were officially recognized and enshrined as a source of law only by the currently valid Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Never before has the question of recognizing the resolutions of the Supreme Court as a source of law been so unequivocally resolved, not only in legislation but also in legal science.

Discussions on this issue have a long history. For instance, P.E. Orlovsky, back in 1940, in his article "The Significance of Judicial Practice in the Development of Soviet Law," expressed the view that the resolutions of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the USSR are a kind of normative subordinate legislation [1; 30].

In general, the study of the nature of these acts was closely linked to the nature of interpretation and application of the law itself, i.e., whether they contain any lawmaking elements or not. Depending on the answer to this question, different authors held corresponding positions regarding the legal nature of the resolutions of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the USSR. In particular, I.B. Novitsky considered the statement incorrect that the process of interpreting and applying many laws is inseparably linked with the development of specific provisions that clarify them. In this regard, he interpreted the guiding clarifications of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the USSR solely as acts of interpretation and explanation of legal norms, aimed at drawing the courts" attention to the errors they make in applying the norms and eliminating them [1; 29].

For the first time in the history of Kazakhstan"s constitutional development, the scope of current law was outlined, which, according to paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, includes the norms of the Constitution, relevant laws, other normative legal acts, international treaties and other obligations of the Republic, as well as the normative resolutions of the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Court of the Republic. In accordance with this paragraph, the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan are a source of current law and may establish new norms not found in other sources of law.

This constitutional provision was specified in the Law "On Normative Legal Acts." Thus, according to Article 3 of this Law, the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan are classified as the main type of normative legal acts. However, paragraph 4 of Article 4 indicates that these acts are outside the hierarchy of normative legal acts. Paragraph 2 of the same article states that the hierarchy is based on the relationship of normative legal acts according to their legal force. But being outside the hierarchy does not mean that the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan lack legal force. Paragraph 4 of Article 4 of this Law only indicates that the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan are outside the hierarchy mentioned in paragraph 2 of the same article, not that these acts are outside the system of normative legal acts altogether. The introduction of this provision indicates the complexity of clearly defining the relationship between the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan and other normative legal acts in terms of legal force. G. Saparaliev and G. Suleimenova see in this provision the legislator"s attempt to distinguish the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan as a special group of acts that possess only certain characteristics of normativity. In their opinion, this characteristic is that the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan are formally binding when considering all cases resolved based on the interpreted norm [2; 22].

Analyzing the content of paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Constitution, G. Saparaliev and G. Suleimenova argue that, according to this provision of the Constitution, the sources of current law are divided into: 1) the norms of the Constitution; 2) normative legal acts; 3) normative resolutions of the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Court.

Based on this, they conclude that the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court do not belong to the second group and, therefore, are not normative legal acts. Logical, semantic, and linguistic analysis allows us to distinguish not three, but two main groups of sources of current law, as listed in the Constitution: 1) the norms of the Constitution; 2) other normative legal acts corresponding to them, including normative resolutions of the Supreme Court [3; 12].

The conjunction "also" used in the aforementioned constitutional provision in relation to the normative resolutions of the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Court is not a divisive but a connective one, and it does not differentiate between sources of current law as normative legal acts and non-normative resolutions of the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Court. Instead, it simply establishes their list [3; 12].

In this case, all other sources (forms) of law present in theory and practice, except for normative legal acts, are completely unsuitable for referring to the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court. At the same time, the introduction of any new forms of law requires a revision of the very theory of sources of law. From the perspective of the existing theory of state and law, the most acceptable approach is to recognize the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court as normative legal acts, since they are adopted by a competent state authority, are intended to regulate an unlimited number of cases in advance, are not decisions on specific cases, and, most importantly, are a source of current law (paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan).

Another constitutional provision defines the scope of the Supreme Court"s activities, which is carried out through the adoption of normative resolutions. Thus, according to Article 81 of the Constitution, "The Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan ... provides clarifications on issues of judicial practice."

Thus, the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court provide clarifications on issues of judicial practice. The Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges" interprets the constitutional norms somewhat differently. For example, paragraph 3, item 3 of Article 17 of this law states: "The Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopts normative resolutions that provide clarifications on issues of applying legislation in judicial practice." A question arises: what is meant by the word "legislation" in the Constitutional Law? This term can be used in several meanings. In one case, it refers only to laws; in another, it refers to both laws and subordinate normative legal acts [4; 28]. The normative resolution of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated March 6, 1997, does not provide an answer to this question. It only establishes that the Supreme Court is authorized to issue normative resolutions solely on issues related to the application of legislation (again) in judicial practice, including the norms of the Constitution. From this resolution, it is clear that constitutional norms are included under the concept of "legislation," but there is no mention of the norms of subordinate normative legal acts.

The Constitution does not limit the scope of the Supreme Court"s clarifications to the area of legislation, and in the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court itself, clarifications are provided not only for the norms of laws but also for subordinate normative legal acts. Therefore, the concept of legislation here should be understood in a broader sense, i.e., it should include subordinate acts. Supporting this conclusion is paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Law "On Normative Legal Acts." According to it, legislation is the aggregate of all normative legal acts adopted in the prescribed manner.

At the same time, the Constitution deliberately avoids the word "legislation." The Constitution states that "judicial power extends to all cases and disputes arising under the Constitution, laws, other normative legal acts, and international treaties of the Republic" (paragraph 2, Article 76 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan). Thus, the concept of "legislation" still narrows the constitutional provision, as it does not include international treaties, which are not part of national legislation but are an independent source of current law [5; 443].

The limitations imposed by the aforementioned Constitutional Law on the inclusion of the concept of "legislation" do not end there. They also concern the form of law implementation. Thus, the scope of clarifications provided by the Supreme Court is limited from all forms of law implementation to issues related to its application in judicial practice.

The application of law is a special form of its implementation – the consideration and resolution of cases by state authorities or officials authorized to do so, and the adoption of decisions that determine the legal significance of established facts. By providing clarifications only on issues related to the application of legislation, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan should address only the courts and only regarding the application of the law. The activities of individuals and legal entities dealing with the court, concerning the observance, enforcement, and use of law, remain, according to the Constitutional Law, outside the scope of the issues on which the Supreme Court provides clarifications, which contradicts the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, according to which the Supreme Court "gives clarifications on issues of judicial practice" (Article 81 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan). As we can see, the constitutional provision does not limit the scope of clarifications either by the form of law implementation or the area of legislation, but rather outlines the scope of clarifications, stating that it only includes issues of judicial practice. It is necessary, however, to clarify the meaning and role of the term "judicial practice" here, considering its influence on the adoption of normative resolutions by the Supreme Court. For instance, A.F. Shchebatov defines judicial practice as "the known tendency of courts to resolve certain categories of cases, embodied in legally binding decisions and rulings of courts of various instances" [6; 135]. The Supreme Court is in no way bound by the presumed or actually existing tendency when issuing normative resolutions.

Many normative resolutions of the Supreme Court are adopted because such a tendency exists, but it is negative, i.e., typical deficiencies and errors in judicial practice are identified. For example, the preamble of the normative resolution of the Supreme Court "On Certain Issues of Imposing a Sentence of Imprisonment" [7] states: "After discussing the results of summarizing judicial practice on sentencing to imprisonment, the plenary session of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan notes that courts commit serious errors when applying this type of punishment."

The legal dictionary gives a different definition of judicial practice, describing it as "the activity of courts in applying legislation when considering judicial cases" [8; 462]. This definition is also not entirely correct, as it includes only the activity of applying the law, excluding other forms of law implementation: compliance, enforcement, and usage.

A more acceptable definition is the one given by A.K. Daulbaev. He defines judicial practice as the entire set of activities of courts in implementing legislation when considering civil, criminal, administrative, and other judicial cases [9; 17]. The concept of "legislation," as already noted, does not include international treaties, which are not part of national legislation. In the definition provided, the use of the term "current law" is more appropriate, as, according to paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, it includes not only national legislation but also international treaties and other obligations of the Republic.

Thus, judicial practice in the context of Article 81 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan refers to the entire set of activities of courts in implementing (not just applying) current law, including not only national legislation, when considering civil, criminal, administrative, and other judicial cases.

Judicial practice serves as the factual basis for the adoption of normative resolutions. The Supreme Court studies judicial practice and, based on the results of its generalization, considers issues related to the observance of the rule of law in the administration of justice by the courts of the republic (paragraph 2, item 2, Article 17 of the Constitutional Law "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges").

In general, the rule of law implies "the universality and accuracy of the enforcement of the law"s requirements by all state bodies, officials, and citizens" [10; 164]. An analysis of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan shows that they are aimed at ensuring the unity of judicial practice and the correct application of current laws [11; 153]. The content of the rule of law largely depends on the content of the explanatory work carried out by various subjects of interpretation of legal norms, expressed in the results of interpretation [12; 28]. Essentially, the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court are such results of interpretation.

It is no secret that even the clearest and most straightforward law requires interpretation when applied. While not entirely identical to the process of applying the law, the interpretation of the law is not only a necessary prerequisite but also an element of applying the law (legal norm) [13; 143]. This is especially important in the field of judicial proceedings, as the greatest harm among all errors made by law enforcement bodies is caused by mistakes in the justice system [14; 44].

All normative legal acts, extending their effect in a specific manner in space, time, and to a group of individuals, must be applied in accordance with the sole and actual content of the legal norms enshrined in them. This provision corresponds to the principle of the unity of the rule of law. There cannot be different rule of law in the courts of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The normative resolutions of the Supreme Court are precisely aimed at ensuring such unity of the rule of law in the sphere of judicial proceedings. The implementation of this principle in the justice system is of particular importance.

The extension of judicial power to all cases and disputes arising under the norms of current law, and the binding nature of court rulings for all citizens, organizations, and officials (paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 76 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan), gives normative resolutions of the Supreme Court special authority and scope of practical effect, extending beyond the boundaries of judicial proceedings and the entire judicial system as a whole. After all, in order to have the ability to protect one"s rights in court and to most likely expect a favorable resolution of a case, the understanding and implementation of the law by the parties involved must correspond to the court"s understanding of the law, which, in turn, will follow the interpretation of the law as enshrined in the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court. Moreover, these acts are universally binding normative legal acts and must be adhered to regardless of the rulings issued by local and other courts in specific cases and disputes.

The clarification of legal norms certainly contributes to uniformity and legality in law enforcement activities. But what should be done if, when considering and resolving a case, the court encounters the fact that the necessary legal norm is absent? In this case, gaps in current law, identified by judicial practice, can be filled by the Supreme Court. The legality of such law-completing provisions is ensured by the fact that they must comply with the norms of current law, and by the fact that when formulating them, analogy of the law or, in extreme cases, analogy of rights must be applied. Such "legitimized" norms, of course, contribute to achieving uniformity in the field of judicial proceedings.

The general focus of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court on achieving legality and uniformity in judicial practice helps to implement the specific tasks of particular forms of judicial proceedings. For example, according to Article 8 of the Criminal Procedure Code, one of the tasks of criminal proceedings is the correct application of criminal law. Many normative resolutions of the Supreme Court are dedicated precisely to ensuring the correct application of criminal law norms. These include, for example, the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court "On Judicial Practice in Theft Cases," "On Judicial Practice in Hooliganism Cases," and so on.

Normative resolutions of the Supreme Court not only contribute to the observance of the principle of the unity of the rule of law in the field of judicial proceedings, but also aim to ensure the unity of the judicial system itself, as they are unified, general, and binding for all courts of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In general, "the unity of judicial power as a principle stems from the unitary structure of the Republic of Kazakhstan" [11; 109].

Normative resolutions adopted by the Supreme Court are issued not on any legal norms in the field of judicial proceedings, but only on those that cause difficulties, errors, and misinterpretations during their application. This conclusion can be drawn from the analysis of the reasons for issuing normative resolutions, which in many cases are explicitly stated in these acts. From this, it follows that the Supreme Court"s interpretations are not of newly adopted legal norms, but only those that have already been implemented in judicial practice. This means that the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court are more preventive in nature than predictive. A common theme in these acts is the warning against violating constitutional principles aimed at protecting the rights and freedoms of citizens, their equality before the law and the court, and the need to maintain a unified legal space. Establishing such a warning in the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court aligns with the tasks and functions of the judiciary as an independent branch of the unified state power, which "is exercised on behalf of the Republic of Kazakhstan and aims to protect the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens and organizations, ensuring the implementation of the Constitution, laws, other normative legal acts, and international treaties of the Republic" (paragraph 1, Article 76 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan). The normative resolutions adopted by the Supreme Court are aimed at the consistent implementation of constitutional principles of a democratic state, the highest values of which are the individual, his rights, and freedoms [3; 13].

Normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as a source of current law, are universally binding normative legal acts. The purpose of adopting these acts is to establish uniformity in judicial practice. In this regard, let us quote a statement expressing some concerns about giving binding force to the clarifications of the highest judicial instances: "The independence of the court, including from the "guiding" clarifications of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, is the highest value and the foundation of true justice, and the clarifications of the Supreme Court on issues of judicial practice should be of a recommendatory nature..." [15; 57].

The constitutional norm stating that "a judge, in the exercise of justice, is independent and is subject only to the Constitution and the law" (paragraph 1, Article 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan) should not be taken literally. After all, subordinate acts corresponding to the Constitution and the law must also be applied during judicial proceedings. On the other hand, the court is not authorized to apply laws and other normative acts that infringe upon the rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens as enshrined in the Constitution. In this case, the court must suspend the proceedings and refer the matter to the Constitutional Council with a proposal to recognize this act as unconstitutional (Article 78 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan). The judiciary"s purpose is to protect the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of not only individuals but also organizations. In the case of a law violating the constitutional rights of organizations, the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan should be applied as an act of direct action.

As we can see, the principle of the independence of judges and their subordination only to the Constitution and the law is quite flexible. Acts subordinate to the Constitution and the law must also be applied by the courts in the administration of justice. At the same time, the binding nature of the law for the court is not absolute or unshakable, and there are certainly no grounds to absolutize the binding nature of normative resolutions of the Supreme Court. If we follow the logic of the author of the cited statement to its conclusion, it would mean that to ensure the fullest independence of the court, all normative acts (perhaps except for the Constitution) should have only a recommendatory character for the court.

The independence of the court is not free will and discretion. It should not be absolute. Judicial independence is always independence within the framework of legality. Undoubtedly, normative resolutions of the Supreme Court must also comply with these requirements.

The binding nature of a particular normative act should not be understood abstractly (the act is binding, and that"s it). Legal force is always supported by certain legal consequences for violating the provisions of the act. Sanctions can be established within the normative act itself or determined by other legislation.

The Supreme Court is not authorized to impose sanctions for violating the provisions of its own or other normative acts; this is the prerogative of the legislator.

As M.A. Gurvich rightly pointed out, "granting a violation of a guiding explanation the status of grounds for the annulment of corresponding court rulings, as suggested by S.N. Bratus and A.B. Vengerov, would mean turning them from provisions on the application of law into genuine norms of law" [16; 135]. Such a rule does not exist in the legislation today. However, an argument can be made in a different direction. Normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan are a source of current law, and this means that the so-called "provisions on the application of law" as described by M.A. Gurvich have indeed become genuine norms of current law.

A judge willingly submits to the authority of judicial practice, as the possible future annulment of his decisions that contradict this practice serves as a form of coercive sanction ensuring the application of this practice [17; 22]. This statement by E.B. Abdrasulov applies to all forms of expression and establishment of judicial practice. Thus, in our opinion, the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as a source of current law and a form of expression and establishment of judicial practice, may have the annulment or modification of a court decision that does not conform to the provisions of these acts as a coercive sanction. They can, as a rule, only serve as an additional, though still formally legal, basis for the annulment or modification of a court decision.

The grounds for this, according to Article 365 of the Civil Procedure Code, may include the incorrect interpretation of substantive law or the incorrect application of the analogy of law or analogy of rights. By incorrect interpretation of the law, we mean its inconsistency with the interpretation provided in the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court. In cases involving the analogy of law, the Supreme Court specifies which norm should be applied by analogy. The Supreme Court may also establish rules that clarify the application of this analogy. The significance of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court increases even further in cases involving the analogy of rights. In this case, the Supreme Court effectively formulates a legal norm based on the general principles and meaning of the legislation. As a source of current law, the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court in these cases will have, although an additional, still formal-legal basis for the annulment or modification of a court decision.

As for the annulment or modification of a court verdict, the situation is more complex. Courts often refer to the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan in their verdicts. They also reference them in resolutions to annul or modify verdicts. In this case, can we say that the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan have become at least an additional (to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan) but still a formal-legal basis for the annulment or modification of a verdict? According to paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan: "The criminal legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan consists exclusively of this Criminal Code. Other laws establishing criminal liability apply only after being incorporated into this Code." Commenting on this article, I.I. Rogov states that "the sole formal source of criminal law is the criminal law, more precisely, the Criminal Code" [18; 7]. Thus, in our opinion, the annulment or modification of a court verdict cannot be a sanction for violating the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court. Their provisions in this case can only be perceived as the position of the highest judicial instance on issues related to the application of the norms of criminal law, and not as a directive of substantive law.

As for procedural law, according to paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court are an integral part of civil procedural and criminal procedural law, respectively. This implies that the grounds for the annulment or modification of a court decision or verdict, which are of a procedural nature, established in the CPC and CPC, can be specified in the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court. For example, in the normative resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On the Practice of Considering Criminal Cases in Appeal" [19], it is stated that "the inconsistency of the court"s conclusion with the factual circumstances of the case should be understood as errors in the evaluation of evidence, the reasoning behind the decision, accusations based on evidence not examined during the trial, as well as when the information provided in the verdict contradicts the factual data established by the court." Thus, the annulment or modification of a court decision or verdict, with reference not only to the CPC and the CPC but also to the inconsistency of judicial acts with procedural prescriptions contained in the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court, can be considered a sanction, a legal consequence not only for non-compliance with the mentioned laws but also with the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court.

The legal force of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court will always be subordinate to the legal force of the norms being clarified. Based on the correct interpretation, an incorrect explanation in an interpretative act should be rejected, but such "rejection" of the official interpretation should be carried out based on a detailed argumentation, refuting the official clarification and confirming the correctness of another interpretation, different from the official one [20; 165].

As already noted, the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court are outside the hierarchy of normative legal acts. Therefore, they should not have equal, let alone superior, power compared to the clarified normative acts. Based on this position, the suggestion made by V.B. Abdrakhmanova is objectionable, which states: "The normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan should stand at the same level as those norms of legislation that are the subject of interpretation by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan" [21; 23]. Now, let us turn our attention to paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Law "On Normative Legal Acts," according to which "in the event of contradictions between normative legal acts of the same level, the provisions of the later enacted act shall apply." Thus, the contradiction between the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court and, for example, the clarified law should be resolved in favor of applying the former. In our opinion, such equalization is unacceptable. The normative resolutions of the Supreme Court should be positioned between the level of the clarified act and the act one level lower, taking into account the corresponding provisions of acts by the Constitutional Council and authentic interpretations of subordinate acts.

The interpretation of the Constitution by the Constitutional Council has greater legal force than the explanations of its norms provided by the Supreme Court. As for the interpretation of laws, one can make only one observation: the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan currently actually performs official public interpretative acts of legislative acts. However, if the legislation specifically delegates this authority to another body or official, the official interpretation provided by them, according to A.K. Daulbaev, will have greater legal force than the explanations of the law provided in the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court [22; 19].

Characterizing the legal force of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court, K. Mami and Z. Banchev point out that "the "placement outside the hierarchy" does not mean being outside the system of normative legal acts, but merely indicates the special legal force of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Council. This force is defined by the fact that for the Constitutional Council, the norms of the Constitution are binding, and for the Supreme Court, the norms of the Constitution and laws are binding (paragraph 1, Article 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan)" [23; 13]. We have already commented on the constitutional norm cited by the authors in parentheses. Let us repeat, but now in relation to this statement, that for the Supreme Court, as well as for other courts, the norms of subordinate acts that comply with the Constitution and the law are also mandatory, not recommendatory. The Supreme Court is not authorized to ignore the norms of subordinate acts when issuing normative resolutions.

According to paragraph 2 of Article 45 of the Law "On Normative Legal Acts," official interpretations of subordinate acts are provided by the bodies and officials who adopted (issued) them. The interpretation of subordinate acts by the Supreme Court should not contradict the interpretation given by the entities that issued the corresponding acts. Interpretative acts of the body that has the legislatively established right to provide official normative interpretations have higher legal force [24; 21]. According to paragraph 4 of Article 44 of the mentioned law, the meaning of subordinate acts, when interpreted (including in the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court), must be disclosed in full compliance with legislative acts. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that the legal force of these acts of the Supreme Court will always be subordinate to the legal force of the norms being clarified.

Normative resolutions of the Supreme Court have an autonomous character of action [25; 181]. This is expressed in the following: the change or annulment of acts for which normative resolutions have been adopted does not automatically lead to the change or annulment of the resolutions of the Supreme Court. The recognition of the corresponding resolution as invalid is formalized by another normative resolution specifically. The normative resolutions of the Supreme Court may be amended or annulled not because the interpreted act has lost its force, but because of the modification or annulment of the norms contained in it, which may be successfully "transferred" to another normative legal act, and in that case, the normative resolution will not require any changes.

There are measures that ensure the compliance of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court with current legislation. One such preventive measure can be found in paragraph 27 of the Regulations of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, according to which "the discussion of issues of judicial practice at the plenary session takes place in the form of: a report by a judge, speeches by judges of the Supreme Court, a representative of the interested state body, members of the scientific advisory council. The opinion of the Chairman of the Constitutional Council, the General Prosecutor, the Minister of Justice, a representative of the President"s Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and other invited individuals is heard on the discussed issue." The corrective measures, i.e., those aimed at bringing the already adopted normative resolution of the Supreme Court into compliance with current legislation, include:

1.The protest by the General Prosecutor of the Republic of Kazakhstan, according to paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On the Prosecutor"s Office," against the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan in case they contradict the Constitution and the laws of the Republic;

Based on the above, several conclusions can be drawn:

1.Normative resolutions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as a source of current law, are normative legal acts. The Supreme Court provides clarifications on the implementation in judicial practice of the Constitution, laws, subordinate acts, and international treaties of the Republic. Judicial practice, in the context of Article 81 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, refers to the entire set of activities of courts in the implementation of current law when considering civil, criminal, administrative, and other judicial cases.

2.Although the purpose of the adoption of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court is usually stated to be ensuring uniformity and legality only in judicial practice, their impact goes beyond these specified boundaries and directly and indirectly contributes to strengthening "unified" legality in other, most important areas of public relations throughout the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

3.Normative resolutions of the Supreme Court, as acts of the judiciary, functionally stem from the goals and tasks of the judiciary itself, which "has as its purpose the protection of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens and organizations, ensuring the implementation of the Constitution, laws, and other normative legal acts, and international treaties of the Republic" (paragraph 1, Article 76 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan).

4.The binding nature of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court in no way encroaches upon judicial independence, as mechanisms and opportunities remain for non-application of these acts in case they are inconsistent with current legislation.

5.Normative resolutions of the Supreme Court can, as a rule, serve as an additional formal-legal basis, though still legally valid, for the annulment or modification of a court decision or verdict. This conclusion applies to verdicts only in cases of violations of the provisions of the normative resolutions of the Supreme Court, which form part of criminal procedural law. They are not included in criminal law.

6.Normative resolutions of the Supreme Court and the acts they clarify should not be placed on the same level in the hierarchy of normative legal acts. The normative resolutions of the Supreme Court create a special sublevel within the level of the clarified normative legal act. It should be taken into account that interpretative acts of the body which holds the legislatively established right to provide official normative interpretations have higher legal force.